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Introduction
Context and motivation
Intentional disinformation, or ‘fake news’, is defined as “false stories that appear to be 
news, spread on the internet or using other media, usually created to influence political 
views or as a joke” (Cambridge Dictionary 2021). Though disinformation in the media 
has long existed in a myriad of forms, the modern fake news phenomenon has garnered 
significant attention recently due to its pronounced pervasiveness and impact in the 
social media era. Commonly linked to several major recent world events, such as the US 
elections and Brexit, modern fake news has had significant and well-documented influ-
ence in contemporary politics and society—and has subsequently received substantial 
attention, both in popular discourse and academic research.
In addition, though less commonly discussed, recent studies have shown fake news 
similarly capable of significantly impacting security prices and financial markets (Clarke 
2018; Kogan et al. 2019). For instance, Clarke et al. (2018) and Kogan et al. (2019) both 
analyse the fake news articles on Seeking Alpha which were identified by a 2017 SEC 
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crackdown to have artificially inflated certain stock prices. In another high-profile case, 
a series of fake WhatsApp messages shared on Twitter incited a bank run on the UK-
based Metro Bank in May 2019—and are associated with the subsequent plunge that hit 
Metro Bank’s share price (Makortoff et al. 2019).
However, despite fake news’ recent general popularity as a research focus, the amount 
of research available on fake news’ impacts specifically in financial markets remains 
notably limited. The overwhelming majority of studies remain focused on fake news’ 
political and social impacts, and these are additionally largely isolated to methods for 
detecting and countering fake news. In particular, while prior literature has proven that 
fake news can have statistically significant impacts on financial markets (Clarke et  al. 
2018; Kogan et al. 2019), no research currently exists to formally provide an economic 
rationale or model for how this is at all possible.
According to the tenets of the efficient-market hypothesis (a popular base economic 
model for financial markets), fake news should not be able to impact market prices as it 
conveys spurious information that should be rejected by rational agents in an efficient 
market (Fama 1970). This implies that fake news’ observed impacts in financial markets 
are irrational and should not exist as they contradict the efficient-market hypothesis—
despite the empirical proof to the contrary.
Yet, in spite of this stark disjoint between economic theory and empirical evidence, no 
existing literature or model currently provides an applicable and effective explanation 
for how fake news’ impacts could rationally persist in financial markets in contradic-
tion of the efficient-market hypothesis. As such, this paper aims to initiate this research 
by proposing a novel theoretical base model that provides a formal and rigorous eco-
nomic explanation covering the primary drivers of how fake news generates statistically-
significant impacts in financial markets—as well as empirical validation for the model’s 
dynamics and predictions. By providing a formalised starting point, this paper addition-
ally hopes to stimulate future research to build upon this base model, to account for fur-
ther conditions and variables, and more fully explain fake news’ financial impacts.
Paper outline and contributions
This paper seeks to provide a formal economic explanation of how fake news can gener-
ate impacts in financial markets, through a combination of theory and empirics—and 
offers several novel contributions to the literature. As previously described, this primar-
ily centres around proposing an original formal economic model to explain the empiri-
cally-proven impacts that fake news can have on financial markets. An extended version 
of the model also provides a hypothesis for an additional novel impact of fake news in 
financial markets which has not been formally analysed by prior literature—which is 
validated along with the overall model’s qualitative accuracy through empirical testing.
The paper progresses as follows. First, established behavioural finance biases are intro-
duced to explain and reconcile empirically observed price overreactions to fake news 
with empirically observed price underreactions to real news. This occurs through the 
structure of a novel unified representative agent model, driven by bounded rationality 
over uncertainty in information veracity. This model is then extended with established 
fake news-specific characteristics, and predicts a new secondary impact of fake news: 
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that fake news in a security amplifies underreactions to subsequent real news for the 
security.
Next, the model’s dynamics and predictions are evaluated through a large-sample 
empirical event study. This is conducted as a novel event study over the 2019 Chinese 
ADR Delisting Threat fake news and debunking event—one of the only large-sample 
events which allows the full model (including the novel hypothesised secondary fake 
news effect) to be tested. Using the Adjusted Patell test with bootstrapped normal criti-
cal values, the event study accounts for cross-sectional correlation, unrepresentative 
excessively volatile observations, and non (standard) normal distributions—ensuring the 
robustness of the empirical test.
The empirical results indicate statistically significant price overreactions to fake news 
and price underreactions to debunking over the event, and provide qualitative support 
for the model’s predictions—including the proposed secondary fake news effect. As 
such, the empirical results validate this paper’s model, and reinforce the robustness of 
the paper’s proposed formal economic explanation of fake news’ impacts in finance.
Literature review
As previously mentioned, there is a distinct scarcity of literature on fake news in finan-
cial markets—and a complete lack of literature explaining the economic rationale of fake 
news’ impacts on financial markets and prices. This shortage of prior literature on the 
subject serves as one of the primary motivations for this paper, but also limits the rel-
evance of inferences that can be directly drawn from prior studies.
However, in building an original economic model and explanation for fake news’ 
impacts in financial markets, this paper still draws inferences from three sets of exist-
ing literature. These include literature characterising fake news’ impacts on agents and 
communities (specifically in comparison to real news, and on financial markets), studies 
on established behavioural finance effects and biases, and existing formalised models of 
price underreaction and overreaction (relative to the predictions of the efficient-market 
hypothesis).
Fake news and financial markets
The majority of recent literature on fake news focuses on its characteristics in politics 
and society. The most recent and numerous of these studies are even more specifically 
tailored to detecting and countering fake news—fields which are not relevant to the 
objective of this paper. However, in building an effective model for fake news’ financial 
impacts, it is important to understand the defining characteristics of how fake news 
impacts agents and communities, in comparison to real news—which are provided by 
several key papers.
One of these papers, Allcott and Gentzkow (2017), build a model of media markets 
and content producers to explain how fake news in society can arise in equilibrium, and 
hypothesise that fake news is more convincing than real news due to its relative extrem-
ity in tone and content. This is supported by Vosoughi et al.’s (2018) work in analysing 
the comparative dynamics of real and fake news spread across Twitter—which finds 
that fake news is more novel than real news, and inspired “fear, disgust, and surprise in 
replies”, indicating a strong shock factor which corroborates with Allcott and Gentzkow’s 
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(2017) hypothesis. Vosoughi et al. (2018) also demonstrate empirical proof of fake news’ 
enhanced impact compared to real news, finding that fake news “diffused significantly 
farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth in all categories of information”. 
This accelerated spread was also empirically attributed to human action, as opposed to 
due to bot involvement, indicating the strong viral characteristic of fake news’ impact 
on agents and communities. This is additionally supported by the research on fake news 
detection, as a common method of detection is through non-physical news content anal-
ysis—indicating that fake news’ non-physical content “like purpose, sentiment, and news 
topics” are detectably different than real news (Zhang and Ghorbani 2020). For instance, 
“fake news creators often use exaggerated title[s] to attract readers’ attention”, and senti-
ment scores measuring the intensity and emotional posture of news articles are recog-
nised as powerful tools for fake news detection (Zhang and Ghorbani 2020). Therefore, 
this emphasises fake news’ relative extremity compared to real news, and further sup-
ports Allcott and Gentzkow’s (2017) hypothesis.
Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) also show that fake news can incur social costs, and 
could render agents more sceptical to all news—including legitimate news. This is rein-
forced by Aymanns et al. (2017) who analyse the spread of fake news through a social 
learning game imposed on a network model. After training a neural network to optimise 
strategies within the model, they find that agents aware of the existence (or even the 
potential) of fake news are likely to “give less weight to their private signals which might 
be biased”. This indicates that agents aware of fake news become more wary of all incom-
ing information, real or fake.
These papers help characterise and differentiate fake news’ general impacts on agents, 
relative to real news; however, the specific dynamics of fake news would be significantly 
different within the financial markets. For instance, agents in financial markets are typi-
cally more sophisticated, valuing true information for profit-making and financial self-
preservation. These agents can also more easily test for and discern the truth of financial 
news, from the granular, quantitative detail available in finance—for instance through 
financial statements or equity research reports, against which financial news can be 
independently analysed by any agent. Therefore, this hinders fake news’ impacts (and 
study) in finance, which is supported by Vosoughi et al. (2018) who find subdued fake 
news effects in in the financial markets compared to the political sphere.
Despite this—and despite the relative scarcity of research on fake news in finance—
there have been several papers that have statistically proven fake news’ ability to have 
significant impacts on financial markets and prices. For instance, Kogan et al. (2019) and 
Clarke et al. (2018) both provide analyses on fake news impacts using the SEC crackdown 
on fake stock promotion articles on Seeking Alpha (a financial crowd-sourced news plat-
form) in April 2017. Kogan et al. (2019) demonstrate 8% average initial fake news price 
impacts on small firms. These fully reverse within a year, indicating fake news’ tempo-
rary credibility even without debunking. Clarke et al. (2018) also demonstrate fake news 
generating significant abnormal trading volumes and initial price impacts, which are 
smaller than equivalent real news; indicating that agents partially discount fake news. 
Kogan et  al. (2019) additionally support Aymanns et  al. (2017) and Allcott and Gen-
tzow’s (2017) theory that fake news awareness increases wariness towards subsequent 
news, showing that exposing fake news’ presence decreases abnormal trading volumes 
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significantly for subsequent news. It is important to remember though, that research on 
fake news in financial markets is a relatively young and niche field, with limited existing 
literature. Both papers study the impacts of the similar events and similar financial fake 
news articles, which primarily influenced small firms. This lack of external validity there-
fore limits the overall inferences that previous literature can provide.
These papers therefore characterise fake news’ impacts on agents, relative to real news, 
and empirically support fake news’ capability to statistically impact financial markets 
and prices. However, pre-existing literature remains insufficient in providing a formal 
economic rationale which reconciles the contradiction between fake news’ statistical 
impacts on financial prices and the efficient-market hypothesis; the provision of which 
forms this paper’s primary objective and original contribution.
Behavioural finance effects
As previously described, the efficient-market hypothesis dictates that security prices 
should fully, and correctly, reflect all available information (Fama 1970). Fake news 
should therefore be ignored by rational agents and market prices, as fake news conveys 
spurious information. As seen in the “Fake news and financial markets” section though, 
several papers statistically prove this as empirically violated. This results in a contradic-
tion between economic theory and empirical evidence, rendering fake news’ impacts 
on financial markets and prices seemingly economically irrational. As such, providing 
a formal economic model explaining how fake news can rationally have statistically sig-
nificant impacts on financial markets and prices is the primary objective of this paper, as 
this has so far not been reconciled by any prior literature.
However, significant literature does exist from several modern economic schools of 
thought that consider such ‘irrational’ contradictions to the efficient-market hypothesis 
as phenomena which are simply poorly or incompletely represented by traditional mod-
els. These schools of thought believe that these contradictions can be explained as per-
fectly economically rational outcomes and actions with the appropriate constraints and 
models. This has led to significant research dedicated to formally modelling and ration-
alising observed exceptions to the base efficient-market hypothesis model.
One of the most prominent of these schools of thought, the field of behavioural 
finance, explains deviations from the efficient-market hypothesis as due to bounded 
rationality over constraining cognitive, psychological, and behavioural factors. As such, 
to explain fake news’ impacts on financial markets and prices, this paper uses established 
behavioural finance biases of conservatism and confidence effects.
Analysed in psychology with empirical proof by Edwards (1968), conservatism bias 
represents when agents insufficiently update their beliefs (relative to optimal Bayesian 
updating) against new information. Linking this to financial agents, Barberis et al. (1998) 
rely heavily on conservatism bias in their popular behavioural finance model explaining 
price underreactions and overreactions, relative to the efficient-market hypothesis.
Similarly, confidence as a behavioural bias was studied in psychology by Griffin and 
Tversky (1992), who decompose information into two characteristics: “strength” and 
“weight”; which generate empirical under/overconfidence effects based on which char-
acteristic agents value more. According to Griffin and Tversky (1992), this is because 
“strength” represents information’s qualities of tone and extremity, and “weight” 
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represents information’s credibility. They theorise that more rational agents should 
derive confidence in information from its credibility—as agents which are more confi-
dent in (and therefore are more likely to act on) more credible information, make more 
rational decisions in line with the efficient-market hypothesis. On the other hand, less 
rational agents relying less on credibility and more on “strength” factors, would lead to 
overconfidence in information with low credibility and high “strength”, and underconfi-
dence in the reverse (Griffin and Tversky 1992). Confidence effects are also employed by 
several popular behavioural finance models of price underreactions and overreactions, 
including Daniel et al. (1998) and Barberis et al. (1998).
As such, this research establishes conservatism and confidence as empirically-robust 
behavioural finance effects that can be used to help explain how fake news has statis-
tically significant impacts on financial markets and prices. However, neither effect on 
its own is capable of sufficiently reconciling the ostensible contradiction between the 
efficient-market hypothesis and fake news’ empirical financial impacts. Additionally, 
existing models that rely on each behavioural finance effect rely on particularly narrow 
interpretations of each effect, which apply poorly to fake news. For instance, Barberis 
et al.’s (1998) model relies on conservatism bias, but only considers conservatism against 
real news shocks that may be potentially temporary; this is a very specific context that is 
not directly applicable to fake news’ impacts. Therefore, a new model would need to be 
built, to reconcile conservatism, confidence, and fake news effects, to effectively explain 
fake news’ dynamics.
Models of underreaction and overreaction
As existing models and literature remain insufficient in fully explaining how fake news 
can contradict the efficient-market hypothesis and rationally have impacts on financial 
markets and prices, a new full model needs to be built to effectively achieve this. There-
fore, to construct such a formal behavioural finance model, key inferences were drawn 
from the main models of price underreaction and overreaction that exist in behavioural 
finance literature.
Hong and Stein (1999) represent price underreactions and overreactions as outcomes 
of interactions between heterogenous agents, which react purely to news shocks and his-
torical price trends respectively, with non-instantaneous information diffusion.
Daniel et  al. (1998) build a representative agent model of price underreactions and 
overreactions, relying on overconfidence and self-attribution; where overconfident 
agents disproportionately misinterpret public signals to support initial private signals.
Barberis et al. (1998) build a representative agent model of price underreactions and 
overreactions, based on conservatism and representativeness biases; where agents mis-
interpret random-walk information shocks, as either mean-reverting or continuous 
trends.
These form the main behavioural finance explanations for price underreactions/
overreactions. However, they remain largely inapplicable to fake news, as they assume 
(at least partial) information veracity, and would immediately reject fake news’ purely 
spurious information. Additionally, contradicting this paper’s empirical findings in 
the “Empirical evidence” section, Daniel et al. (1998) and Barberis et al.’s (1998) mod-
els would imply that prices would not underreact at all to debunking—since debunking 
Page 7 of 30Fong  Financ Innov            (2021) 7:53  
represents real and accurate news which unambiguously discredits prior fake news, and 
cannot be misinterpreted.
Only Hong and Stein’s (1999) model of non-instantaneous information diffusion could 
partially explain this underreaction to debunking. However, to achieve this, Hong and 
Stein’s (1999) model would need to rely on unreasonably strong assumptions of similar-
ity between real and fake news’ impacts. This renders Hong and Stein’s (1999) model 
similarly inappropriate for explaining the empirical underreaction to debunking fake 
news—as in reality, and as shown in the “Fake news and financial markets” section, fake 
news’ impacts on agents have distinctly different characteristics compared to real news. 
Such differences should therefore indicate heterogenous price underreaction or overre-
action patterns in reaction to fake and real news. However, Hong and Stein’s (1999) non-
instantaneous information diffusion model would instead predict homogenous, albeit 
mirrored, patterns in reaction to both fake news and subsequent debunking (which 
represents real news). Furthermore, non-instantaneous information diffusion loses rel-
evance with high-profile events in increasingly-digitalised financial markets—as modern 
technology minimises information diffusion delays, particularly in fast moving environ-
ments like the stock market.
Consequently, existing behavioural finance models remain inappropriate for explaining 
fake news’ impacts on financial markets and prices. As such, inspired by such models, 
this paper proposes a new alternative representative agent model of price underreac-
tions and overreactions, based on information veracity uncertainty, to explain fake news’ 
empirical price dynamics.
Model
As shown in the “Literature review” section, prior literature proves that fake news 
empirically generates initial price impacts on financial securities (defined in this paper 
as fake news’ primary impact). As previously discussed, these represent price overreac-
tions that contradict the efficient-market hypothesis—which this paper aims to formally 
rationalise through an economic model.
Prior literature and models of price underreactions and overreactions fail to satisfac-
torily fully explain why or how this primary impact can arise in financial markets. There-
fore, to reconcile this with empirically-observed short-term underreactions to real news, 
this section proposes an original unified representative agent model of price underre-
action/overreaction. Motivated by established behavioural finance biases, the model is 
driven by bounded rationality over uncertainty in information veracity.
Extending the model with fake news-specific characteristics, this section subsequently 
predicts a new secondary fake news impact: that fake news in a security amplifies under-
reactions to all subsequent real news concerning that security.
It is important to note though that, as a completely novel economic model for a nas-
cent field of research, this model merely aims to serve as a base model explaining the pri-
mary drivers of fake news’ empirical impacts on financial markets and prices. As such, 
this model is not intended to be a comprehensive representation of every possible vari-
able or contributing factor in fake news’ financial impacts—but rather, a formal model 
containing multiple simplifications which enable a clearer and more direct understand-
ing of the key levers influencing fake news’ price impacts. By providing such preliminary 
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research into this field, this paper aims to inspire future research to build and expand 
upon this base model—enabling subsequent more complex models in future papers, that 
account for a greater set of variables and conditions, and explore fake news’ financial 
impacts in greater depth and across a wider range of scenarios.
Setting up the model
The model uses a sole representative investor, which therefore sets the security’s market 
prices based on their personal valuation, P . Similar to Hong and Stein’s (1999) “news-
watchers”, the simplified agent forms P purely by internalising news shocks, and does 
“not condition on current or past prices”.
News shocks are simplified to convey direct information on the security’s exogenously 
generated true value. As these news shocks are considered exogenous, their generation 
and conveyance are similarly considered exogenous in the model, and therefore not 
included in the model. For this model, this is akin to each investor simultaneously receiv-
ing each news shock through the same (and only) news outlet—so the only consideration 
is the actual shock itself, and not the transmission mechanism to each agent. In reality, 
the outlet and transmission mechanism of such news shocks would certainly influence 
the nuances of their credibility and impacts on agents. However, for parsimoniousness 
and the purposes of isolating the main drivers of how fake news impacts financial mar-
kets and prices, this simplification will be used to focus directly on the nature of each 
news shock in the model. As such, the security’s modelled market price dynamics will 
depend solely on how the agent values each news shock.
The model additionally simplifies news shocks into two distinct extremes: real and 
fake. Real shocks in this model are accurate and unambiguous numerical indicators of a 
security’s value, occurring whenever this value updates. Fake shocks in this model con-
vey similar numerical indicators of a security’s value, but are conversely purely spurious. 
As this model’s news shocks directly convey a security’s numerical value, only one is ever 
contemporaneously accurate; the rest must be fake or outdated. Again, it is important to 
note that this is a simplified model. In reality, most news shocks will convey information 
on contributing factors to a security’s value, as opposed to its direct numerical value (i.e. 
information on a company’s operating performance and brand perception, as opposed 
to information on what the true dollar value of their shares is). As such, multiple news 
shocks would be able to remain contemporaneously accurate. However, for the purposes 
of isolating the main drivers of fake news’ impacts on financial markets and prices, the 
model simplifies news shocks this way to focus directly on the impact of each type of 
news shock.
The model starts at time 0 with a real news shock, I0 , forming the initial P . This valua-
tion evolves with subsequent news shocks, based on a weighted average.
News shock, In , occurs at period t = n , where n ∈ {0, . . . ,M} . M represents the period 
of the latest news shock. The model assumes a maximum of one news shock per period.
Information weight determinants: base model
The agent’s security valuation, P , is a weighted average of news shocks, In , weighted by 
their weighted shares, θn:
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The weighted shares for individual news shocks are determined by the size of their 
information weights, Sn , relative to the sum of all information weights, so the weighted 
shares sum to 1:
The information weights, Sn , represent the relative importance of the different news 
shocks to the agent. Therefore, P represents a weighted average of the valuations con-
veyed by the news shocks, weighted by their relative importance to the agent.
The following sections explain the three terms determining each news shock’s infor-
mation weight: the base value, the irrelevance factor, and the time decay factor. The 
information weight is the product of these terms.
Base value of a news shock
The primary determinant of a news shock’s information weight is its base value, as stan-
dalone information, to the agent. This is determined by the binary variable represent-
ing the news shock In ’s nature, ωn ∈ {0, 1} , and the investor’s ability to distinguish this 
nature, ρ ∈ [0.5, 1]:
ωn = 1 indicates In is real, ωn = 0 indicates In is fake. ρ = 1 indicates an agent perfectly 
able to distinguish between real and fake news, ρ = 0.5 indicates an agent perfectly una-
ble to distinguish between the two.
Combined, Sn(base) measures the agent’s certainty of the news shock’s veracity. 
If agents are perfectly sure that In is real, they will value In fully as the security value; 
Sn(base) = 1 . Conversely, if they are perfectly sure that In is fake, they will be certain of 
its spuriousness and ignore it; Sn(base) = 0 . Therefore, as ρ increases, agents place more 
weight on real news and less on fake news. However, as ρ decreases towards 0.5, the 
agent grows more uncertain of which type they face, optimising over this constraint by 
placing increasingly similar middling weights on both.
This links to Griffin and Tversky’s (1992) paper on confidence. As previously dis-
cussed, Griffin and Tversky’s (1992) decompose information into “strength” (represent-
ing tone and extremity) and “weight” (representing credibility). Rational agents should 
derive confidence in information from its credibility; since relying less on credibility and 
more on “strength”, leads to overconfidence in information with low credibility and high 
“strength”, and underconfidence in the reverse (Griffin and Tversky 1992).
In this paper’s model, real and fake news only differ in credibility, represented by 
ωn . This stems from the understanding that real news—by definition—has inher-
ently stronger credibility than fake news. Simplified to binary terms, the model there-
fore assumes that real news shocks are fully credible ( ωn = 1 ), while fake news shocks 














Sn(base) = [ρωn + (1− ρ)(1− ωn)] ∈ [0, 1]
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model also uses a simplification where “strength” remains equal across news shocks. It 
is important to note that, in reality, these factors would also be influenced by the trans-
mission mechanism (i.e. the news outlets or mode of conveyance) through which these 
news shocks reach agents. However, the model considers news shocks as exogenously 
generated and instantaneously conveyed to agents. Therefore, a news shock’s transmis-
sion mechanism is not considered in the model—enabling such simplifications, which 
allow the model to focus on the news shocks and their direct impacts themselves.
This paper therefore assumes that agents ideally fully rely on credibility, ωn , to deter-
mine their value of a security, but are constrained by their ability to actually distinguish 
ωn . Thus, as ρ determines the agent’s ability to distinguish ωn , ρ determines how much 
agents rely on credibility to determine confidence.
Therefore, the lower an agent’s ρ , the more constrained they are from relying on cred-
ibility; making them more underconfident in real news and overconfident in fake news.
Irrelevance factor of old news
With perfect ability to distinguish information veracity, ρ = 1 , previous news shocks 
should become immediately irrelevant once updated real information is introduced; or 
remain unaffected if new fake information is introduced. However, without ρ = 1 , agents 
are not certain of a shock’s veracity. With updated real shocks this would induce con-
servatism bias, preventing full discounting of past information, due to underconfidence 
in the new shock’s veracity. With new fake shocks, this would cause erroneous discount-
ing of past real shocks, due to overconfidence in the new shock’s veracity.
This forms the core of this model’s underreaction/overreaction mechanism. Based on 
the information veracity uncertainty discussed in the “Information weight determinants: 
base model” section, agents are prevented from immediately switching, or maintaining, 
their valuation fully at the most updated real news shock.
However, old shocks grow increasingly irrelevant over time. For real news, this could 
be because updated real information’s credibility remains persistently robust; so over 
time an updated real shock’s veracity can be increasingly relied on. For instance, reports 
of a takeover become more credible as regulatory protocols are completed, equity swaps 
are offered, and finally as the actual takeover occurs. Alternatively, the availability heuris-
tic, where agents place greater weight on information more ‘available’ or easier to recall 
(Schwarz 1991), could explain this; since older information naturally becomes harder to 
recall over time, after updated information is introduced. Therefore, older news shocks 
grow increasingly irrelevant; conditional on the agent’s certainty in the updated shock’s 
veracity.
These dynamics are modelled by an irrelevance factor:
For each more updated news shock, Ij>n , introduced, In ’s weight is multiplied by an 
additional irrelevance term; which individually and jointly decrease (or at most main-









 ∈ [0, 1]
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Each irrelevance term can be decomposed into four components: the irrelevance 
multiplier, δ ∈ [0, 1] ; the investor’s inability to distinguish between real and fake news, 
(1− ρ) ∈ [0, 0.5] ; the time since news shock Ij>n was introduced, 
(
t − tj + 1
)
≥ 1 ; and 
the base value of updated news shock Ij>n , 
[





These combine to influence In ’s weight as follows:
An investor better at distinguishing information veracity relies less on past informa-
tion, decreasing In ’s weight further for every new shock introduced, through a lower 
(1− ρ) ; which can be amplified by a non-unitary δ , to represent a greater bias against old 
news. At the limit, a perfectly competent agent with (1− ρ) = 0 , fully discounts In once 
a new real shock occurs.
However, the less certain they are of Ij>n ’s veracity, the less they discount old shocks. 
This modifies the irrelevance term, through the agent’s base value of Ij>n in the expo-
nent. Both this base value and δ(1− ρ) are ∈ [0, 1] , so the irrelevance term increases 
towards 1 as certainty in Ij>n ’s veracity decreases. At the limit, with perfect certainty in 
Ij>n ’s spuriousness, Ij>n ’s base value equals 0, so Ij>n ’s overall irrelevance factor equals 
1; so, Ij>n leaves In ’s information weight unaffected. Conversely, with perfect certainty 
in Ij>n ’s veracity, Ij>n ’s base value equals 1 and (1− ρ) equals 0, so In is fully discounted.
Finally, the time since Ij>n ’s introduction increasingly amplifies In ’s irrelevance through 
the exponent, the longer that passes since Ij>n ’s introduction. This starts at 1 upon Ij>n ’s 
introduction, since the introduction of new shocks immediately affects the relevance of 
old information.
Time decay factor of spurious information
Spurious information’s credibility decays over time since, without any solid supporting 
evidence, spurious rumours progressively lose believability.
Kogan et al. (2019) support this, empirically demonstrating that, even without outright 
debunking, fake news’ average initial price impacts on small firms fully reverse within a 
year.
This is represented through a spurious information time decay factor,ϕ ∈ [0, 1]:
At the extremes, ϕ = 0 indicates that spurious information is perfectly temporary 
and decays fully after one period; ϕ = 1 indicates that spurious information suffers 





 into 1, leaving In ’s information weight unaffected unless In is fake.
This factor is amplified by the (t − tn) term in the exponent, diminishing In ’s weight 
further as more time passes since In ’s introduction (if In is spurious).
Information weight determinants: fake news‑specific
The model described so far qualitatively explains both the primary fake news impact and 
underreactions to real news, through an underreaction/overreaction mechanism driven 
by uncertainty in information veracity. However, this paper also proposes an extended 
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Therefore, two additional determinants of information weight are included for the full 
model: the virality factor, and the fake news uncertainty factor.
Virality factor of fake news
Fake news is structured to shock and convince, maximising initial impacts to spread 
faster and deeper than real news (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017; Vosoughi et al. 2018). This 
represents fake news’ amplified virality relative to real news—which serves to magnify 
the weight that agents place on fake shocks.
This is represented through a fake news virality factor, α ≥ 1:
At the lower-bound, a value of α = 1 would indicate that fake news in the model is 
unaffected by virality effects. This factor is also modified by (1− ωn) in the exponent. 
This term ensures that, unless In is fake and ωn = 0 , the entire Sn(viral) factor is neutral-
ised to Sn(viral) = 1 , which thereby leaves In ’s information weight unaffected.
This factor is also modified by the agent’s inability to distinguish information verac-
ity,(1− ρ) , in the exponent; since less capable agents are more susceptible to fake news’ 
virality. This reconciles well with the previously discussed Griffin and Tversky (1992) 
decomposition of information, as more rational agents should have a greater inclination 
to ignore a news shock’s “strength” when determining their confidence in a news shock, 
to instead more heavily rely on its credibility or “weight”.
Indeed, as Griffin and Tversky (1992) characterise information “strength” as represent-
ing tone and extremity, and information “weight” as representing credibility, this virality 
factor serves as an effective representation of information “strength” in the model—and 
therefore helps ensure a more comprehensive model through its inclusion. In compar-
ison, the base model ignores fake news’ differentiating characteristics from real news, 
and assumes that “strength” remains equal across both fake news and real news shocks 
of equal magnitude. However, prior literature indicates that fake news should have spe-
cific characteristics of tonality and extremity which enhance its impacts on agents (All-
cott and Gentzkow 2017; Vosoughi et al. 2018). As such, this is effectively represented in 
the full model by the virality factor, with fake news shocks having greater “strength” than 
real news shocks, as long as α > 1.
Fake news uncertainty factor
Previous literature suggests and proves that awareness of fake news decreases respon-
siveness to subsequent news shocks (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017; Aymanns et al. 2017; 
Kogan et al. 2019).
This enters the model as an investor becoming less able to distinguish information 
veracity upon learning of fake news’ presence. This could be attributed to the avail-
ability heuristic, which makes information that is easier to recall seem erroneously 
more likely (Schwarz et al. 1991). For instance, high-profile events, like plane crashes 
or fake news scandals, are easier to recall—which consequently often makes such 
events seem excessively likely for agents, regardless of their actual statistical like-
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news, if their amplified concern leads them to misattribute possible signs of fake news 
to real news, diminishing their competence; or if the seemingly amplified fake news 
risk diminishes their confidence in accurately distinguishing information veracity.
This fake news uncertainty effect is modelled through a new equation for the inves-
tor’s ability to distinguish between real and fake news, ρ:
ρ0 ∈ [0.5, 1] is initial ability, (1− ρ0) ∈ [0, 0.5] measures initial inability, γ ∈ {0, 1} is a 
binary variable indicating fake news’ signalled presence in the security, and µ ∈ [0, 1] 
represents the fake news uncertainty factor.
This decomposes ρ into: initial investor inability, scaled as a percentage of maxi-





 ; modified by the fake news uncertainty exponent, 
(1− γµ) ; then rescaled back to level inability terms (multiply by 0.5), and transformed 
back into ability (subtract from 1). This therefore models the fake news uncertainty 
effect as a simple modifier affecting the investor’s percentage inability, from which the 
new investor ability can be rederived.
This uncertainty exponent (1− γµ) determines the magnitude of the fake news 
uncertainty effect; depending on the agent becoming aware of fake news’ presence. 
If γ = 0 , fake news’ presence is not signalled, transforming the uncertainty exponent 
to 1, so investor ability remains unchanged; ρ0 = ρ . Conversely, γ = 1 indicates fake 
news’ signalled presence, so the uncertainty exponent would be ∈ [0, 1] . If both the 
uncertainty exponent and the percentage investor inability are ∈ (0, 1) , this increases 
the percentage investor inability, decreasing ρ < ρ0.
The rate of decrease depends on µ . As µ increases, the uncertainty exponent 
decreases, further decreasing ρ . If µ = 1 , discovering fake news renders the agent 
perfectly unable to distinguish information veracity. If µ = 0 , this has no effect.
This affects percentage investor inability, and therefore leaves ρ unaffected, if ρ0 
starts at the extremes. This is because perfectly incompetent investors cannot worsen 
at distinguishing information veracity, and perfectly capable investors are invariably 
unaffected as they disregard fake news completely.
The complete model
The representative agent’s security valuation, P , is formed as follows:
Base model
The base model’s information weight, formed by the determinants in the “Information 
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Full model
The full model’s information weight, formed by the determinants in the “Information 
weight determinants: base model” section, and the fake news-specific determinants in 
the “Information weight determinants: fake news” section, is given as:
Glossary of model terms.
See Table 1.
Impulse‑response functions
To explore model dynamics, this paper models three impulse-response functions for:
• A real news shock, I1
• A fake news shock, I1
• A fake news shock, I1 , followed by a debunking real news shock, I2

































Table 1 Model terms
P Security valuation for the representative agent
t Time period
In News shock conveying an unambiguous security value at time n
n ∈ {0, . . . ,M} Period, t = n , when news shock In occurred
j ∈ {0, . . . ,M|j�n} Period, t = j , when news shock Ij>n occurred
θn ∈ [0, 1]





Sn ≥ 0 Information weight of news shock In
ωn ∈ {0, 1} Real or fake news indicator for In ; information credibility
ρ ∈ [0.5, 1] Ability to distinguish between real and fake news
ρ0 ∈ [0.5, 1] Initial ability to distinguish between real and fake news
δ ∈ [0, 1] Irrelevance multiplier of old news shocks
ϕ ∈ [0, 1] Time decay factor of spurious information
α ≥ 1 Virality factor of fake news
γ ∈ {0, 1} Signalled presence of fake news indicator
µ ∈ [0, 1] Fake news uncertainty factor
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I0 = 100 , so P starts at 100. Each shock has an equal magnitude of difference: I1 = 80 , 
and I2 = 100 = I0 . A debunking shock, I2 , is used, since debunking represents a subse-
quent real news shock which contradicts prior fake news, and signalling the presence of 
prior fake news; thereby activating the fake news uncertainty factor.
The impulse-response functions are modelled with varying initial investor ability, ρ0 , 
and differ between the base and full model where applicable. All other variables are held 
constant at:
Base Model:
• δ = 1 ; there is no additional bias against old news
• ϕ = 0.6
Full Model:
• α = 5
• γ = 1 after debunking shock, I2 , signals fake news’ prior presence; γ = 0 otherwise
• µ = 0.5
One real news shock
For standalone real shocks, both models are identical and are only determined by base 
value and irrelevance factors.
Impulse-response dynamics in Fig. 1, display an initial shift (down from I0 = 100 ) in P 
when the real news shock occurs, for all values of ρ0 . This is a full shift to I1 = 80 when 
ρ0 = 1 ; with increasing underreaction for lower values of ρ0.
Underreaction is resolved over time; moving P towards I1 = 80 . The rate this occurs at 
increases with larger ρ0 values.
This matches the model’s theorised dynamics, where less capable investors underre-
act more to real news, due to conservatism bias from uncertainty over I1 ’s veracity; and 
Fig. 1 Impulse-response function: real news, I1
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qualitatively matches empirical underreactions to real news shocks (Barberis et al. 1998; 
Daniel et al. 1998; Hong and Stein 1999).
One fake news shock
Both models are identical when ρ0 = 1 as the agent is perfectly unaffected by fake news; 
P remains at I0 = 100.
For standalone fake shocks, the full model (light blue) only adds the virality multi-
plier, α . This amplifies the fake shock’s information weight, compared to the base model 
(green); weighting the full model closer to I1 = 80 in each period and ρ0 value.
Impulse-response dynamics in Fig. 2, display an initial shift (down from I0 = 100 ) in P 
when the fake news shock occurs, for ρ0 < 1 ; representing an overreaction to fake news. 
This decreases in ρ0 , as more capable investors overreact less to fake news, due to greater 
certainty in I1 ’s spuriousness; matching the “Information weight determinants: base 
model” section’s theorised dynamics.
The initial shifts for the base model are weaker at every ρ0 , compared to Fig. 1’s shifts 
under equivalent real news; except when ρ0 = 0.5 , where agents cannot distinguish 
information veracity, and initial shifts are equal. Notably, Clarke et  al. (2018) support 
ρ0 > 0.5 , as they show that fake news’ initial price effects are empirically smaller than 
equivalent real news’; indicating that agents empirically can partially distinguish infor-
mation veracity. Comparatively, the full model is amplified by virality, so the initial shift 
could be greater than equivalent real news’, depending on α.
In Fig. 2, the initial overreaction reverses over time; moving P back towards I0 = 100 . 
Here, the time decay factor,ϕ , overrides the irrelevance factor in I0 ’s information weight, 
degrading the fake I1 ’s credibility over time. For relatively stronger irrelevance factors, 
reversion to I0 could be much slower; or even increase the overreaction to I1 over time, if 
the irrelevance factor is stronger than ϕ . However, Fig. 2’s dynamics, with ϕ stronger than 
the irrelevance factor, qualitatively matches empirics; as Kogan et al. (2019) show fake 
news’ initial price effects on small firms reversing fully within a year without debunking.
Fig. 2 Impulse-response function: fake news, I1
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One fake news shock and one real news shock
Both models are identical when ρ0 = 1 as the agent is perfectly unaffected by fake news; 
P remains at I0 = 100.
For a fake shock followed by debunking, the full model (light blue) adds both the viral-
ity multiplier, α , and the fake news uncertainty factor. α enters first, amplifying the full 
model’s fake shock information weights, compared to the base model (green), identically 
to Fig. 2. After debunking, I2 , occurs and signals fake news’ prior presence, the uncer-
tainty factor enters the full model. This weakens the reversion to I0 for ρ0 = 0.75 , as 
awareness of fake news’ presence renders the agent less able to distinguish information 
veracity; so ρ < ρ0 . The uncertainty factor has no effect when ρ0 = 0.5 or 1 , as perfectly 
competent agents are unaffected by fake news and perfectly incompetent agents cannot 
worsen.
Impulse-response dynamics in Fig.  3, display the same initial overreaction to I1 as 
Fig.  2. After I2 occurs, this overreaction is partially reversed; P reverses towards I0 at 
a faster rate than in Fig.  2, as Fig.  3 exhibits recursion pressure from both debunking 
and Fig. 2’s time decay. However, when ρ0 < 1 , this recursion is not immediate. P persis-
tently deviates from I0 several periods after debunking, as agents underreact to I2 due to 
conservatism bias from uncertainty over I2 ’s veracity.
Underreaction to I2 increases with weaker spurious information time decay, ϕ , and 
lower initial investor capability, ρ0 ; as well as with the full model’s fake news-specific 
effects. Specifically, greater fake news virality, α , and greater fake news uncertainty 
effects, µ , increase underreactions to the debunking real news shock; by persistently 
boosting the prior fake shock’s information weight, and worsening the agent’s ability to 
distinguish information veracity (upon awareness of fake news), respectively.
Therefore, the full model (driven by these fake news-specific effects) predicts a novel 
secondary fake news impact: that fake news in a security amplifies underreactions to all 
subsequent real news for the security.
Fig. 3 Impulse-response function: fake news, I1; real news, I2
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Empirical evidence
The model constructed in the “Model” section predicts underreaction/overreaction 
dynamics following fake and real news shocks. The full model variant also predicts a new 
secondary fake news impact: that fake news in a security amplifies underreactions to all 
subsequent real news for that security.
Therefore, to evaluate both model variants, the following section empirically tests 
security price reactions to the 2019 Chinese ADR Delisting Threat fake news and 
debunking event. A debunked fake news event is specifically used because debunking is 
a subsequent real news shock, clearly signalling prior fake news, with an unambiguous 
theoretical value (i.e. immediate reversal of fake news’ primary impact).
Conducting a robust large-sample event study, accounting for potential cross-correla-
tion bias, unrepresentative excessively volatile observations, and non (standard) normal 
distributions, the empirical results strongly validate the model’s qualitative predictions; 
including the modelled impulse-response dynamics and the predicted secondary fake 
news impact.
Data description
The 2019 Chinese ADR delisting threat
This paper identifies the 2019 Chinese ADR Delisting Threat as a clear example of fake 
news and debunking.
This specific event and data set was used, as it was one of the only events which 
allowed for the full model to be evaluated over a large sample of testable security price 
data. As previously mentioned, to evaluate both model variants, an empirical event was 
needed which introduced a fake news shock that should materially influence a security’s 
valuation, followed by a subsequent contradictory real news shock that also signalled 
the prior fake news’ existence. This combination of shocks would therefore logically 
be found in a debunked fake news event, because debunking is a subsequent real news 
shock which clearly signals prior fake news. To perform an effective statistical test the 
event would also need to have influenced a large number of securities to ensure a large 
sample test, since small-sample tests empirically suffer significant power loss (MacKin-
lay 1997) —and should also have the debunking take place soon enough after the initial 
fake news event to prevent exogenous events from statistically interfering with the aver-
age security price. This narrows the candidate events and data sets for testing consider-
ably. As the set of observed instances of effective fake news in finance is already notably 
limited, given the relatively recent widespread introduction of modern fake news, this 
leaves very few alternatives which are similarly as viable for the empirical evaluation of 
this paper’s model as the 2019 Chinese ADR Delisting Threat.
The event’s timeline proceeds as follows:
• 11:36am EDT, Friday, September 27, 2019 A Bloomberg News article states that the 
Trump administration is considering “delisting Chinese companies from U.S. stock 
exchanges”, citing an anonymous source “close to the deliberations” (Leonard and 
Donnan 2019).
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• 5:06 pm EDT, Saturday, September 28, 2019 A Bloomberg News article states that 
U.S. Treasury official Monica Crowley publicly announced via email that “the admin-
istration is not contemplating blocking Chinese companies from listing shares on 
U.S. stock exchanges at this time” (Leonard et al. 2019), debunking Friday’s rumour.
This was a high-profile event, which would have reasonably affected all Chinese com-
panies with U.S.-listed shares, of which there were 156 as of February 25, 2019 (USCC 
2019). Therefore, this was an unambiguous example of fake news impacting a large num-
ber of public equities, before subsequent debunking.
The event study event window starts on the fake news event date (Friday, September 
27) as day 0, since fake news is immediately introduced with no opportunity for insider 
trading or pre-emption. The event window continues over subsequent trading days to 
Friday, October 18, covering 16 event window days total, over a period of 22 calendar 
days.1
The event study estimation window covers 120 trading days from April 08 to Septem-
ber 26, 2019.
Data selection
The top 100 Chinese firms by market capitalisation, with sufficiently liquid U.S.-listed 
shares avoiding continuous periods of zero trading volume, over the estimation and 
event windows, are used as the event study sample.
The market model indices used are the NYSE and NASDAQ Composite indices, 
respective to each firm’s listing during the estimation and event windows.
U.S. daily closing prices, for each index and firm’s US-listed shares, from April 05 to 
October 18, 2019, were obtained from S&P Capital IQ and used to calculate respective 
log-returns from April 08 to October 18, 2019.
All returns data series are tested via Augmented Dickey-Fuller for stationarity. All tests 
reject the null of non-stationarity at 1% significance; indicating strong stationarity and 
the absence of spurious regressions that would invalidate inferences.
Event study methodology
Event studies “measure the impact of a specific event on the value of a firm” (MacKinlay 
1997), through its impact on their securities’ returns.
The basic event study framework used in this paper follows MacKinlay’s (1997) tradi-
tional method. This first estimates “normal” returns over the event period, as if the event 
never occurred. Then, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over the event period are 
calculated. Finally, these CARs are tested for significance at each event date; using cross-
sectional average CARs for a multi-firm sample.
Estimating normal returns
This paper estimates normal returns, through the market model, as a function of a rep-
resentative wider market’s returns.
The market model is given as (MacKinlay 1997):
1 Public equities do not trade on weekends and public holidays.
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Rit is security i ’s return at time t . Rmt is the market return at time t and εit is a zero-
mean error term. αi and βi are parameters of the market model that would be estimated 
via OLS regression in the estimation window prior to the event window. σ 2εi represents 
the market model variance.
Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns
After predicting normal returns over the event window with the estimated market 
model, the abnormal returns (ARs) and CARs for each event day are calculated as 
(MacKinlay 1997):
ARit is security i ’s abnormal return at time t . CARi(t1, t2) is security i ’s cumulative 




 is the estimated market model rela-
tionship predicting security i ’s normal return at time t.
The cross-sectional average abnormal returns (AARs) and cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAARs) across N  sample firms, are calculated as (MacKinlay 
1997):
ARt is the AAR at time t, and CAR(t1, t2) is the CAAR covering t1 to t2.
Hypothesis testing
The traditional t-test statistics for the ARs, CARs, AARs, and CAARs are calculated 
by dividing their respective values by their respective standard deviations.
The variance of each statistic is calculated as (MacKinlay 1997):
The AR variance is the market model sample variance, σ̂ 2εi , adjusted for forecast 
error. L1 is the length of the estimation window. R̄m is the average market return over 
the estimation window. σ̂ 2m represents the sample market variance over the estimation 
Rit = αi + βiRmt + εit; E(εit) = 0, var(εit) = σ 2εi
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window. With large estimation windows, the forecast error asymptotically converges 




The CAR variance (as the forecast error asymptotically goes to 0) is just the market 
model sample variance,σ̂ 2εi , multiplied by the number of observations covered by the 
CAR, (t2 − t1 + 1).
The AAR and CAAR variances are averages of the respective AR and CAR variances 
across N  sample firms, assuming cross-sectional independence.
To test for fake news’ cross-sectional abnormal price impacts over time and post-
debunking, this paper focuses on testing CAARs. The CAAR t-test statistic, covering 
t1 to t2 , is (MacKinlay 1997):
Under the null hypothesis, CAARs theoretically have zero-mean normal distributions. 
This test statistic standardises the CAARs, to compare against the standard normal two-
tailed critical values. If tCAR(t1,t2) ’s absolute value exceeds the critical values, the null 
hypothesis (that tCAR(t1,t2) is insignificant) can be rejected, and the event’s cumulative 
effect can be shown as persistently significant until t2.
Issues with the traditional event study method
Traditional event studies rely heavily on assumed asymptotic standard normality in their 
test statistics; which is a strong and empirically-flawed assumption. A non-exhaustive 
list of common and pertinent violations includes:
Cross‑sectional correlation Traditional test statistic calculations assume cross-sec-
tional independence. This is clearly violated in multi-firm event studies affected by the 
same event, with identical event and estimation windows (Kramer 1998). This clustering 
implies cross-sectional correlation across the event and estimation window observations, 
generating significant bias even with low levels of cross-correlation (Kolari and Pynnönen 
2010); thereby invalidating traditional t-test statistics.
Non (standard) normal distributions Traditional event studies rely on excess returns 
being naturally normally distributed, or on large enough samples to assume their asymp-
totic normality through central limit theory (CLT), for (asymptotically) standard normal 
test statistics.
However, Brown and Warner (1985) and Ford and Kline (2006) show that daily excess 
returns are inherently non-normally distributed. Furthermore, Kramer (1998) proves 
that no finite sample could feasibly satisfy the conditions necessary for asymptotic 
standard normality in traditional event study test statistics.
This implies that traditional test statistics are non (standard) normally distributed, 
suggesting significant bias and invalidating traditional event study hypothesis testing; as 






∼ N (0, 1)
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Event study extensions and robustness measures
To resolve the issues in the “Issues with the traditional event study method” section, and 
to strengthen this paper’s inferences, several extensions and robustness measures are 
employed.
Patell test
Patell (1976) corrects for outliers with excessive volatility, that may misrepresent 
the event’s impact. They standardise all ARs by their respective standard deviations 
(adjusted for forecast error), cumulate them across the event days, then aggregate them 
over the N  sample firms to form aggregate cumulative standardised abnormal returns 
(ACSARs):
Since standardised ARs theoretically have unit variance, an ACSAR’s variance is just 
its number of event days covered, multiplied by a factor penalising short estimation win-
dow lengths, cumulated across the N  sample firms (Patell 1976).
The ZPatell statistic can then be formed to test cross-sectional cumulative effects 
between t1 and t2 (Patell 1976):
Assuming cross-sectional independence, this statistic is theoretically asymptotically 
standard normal (Patell 1976), and so can be tested against standard normal critical val-
ues, similar to the traditional method.
Adjusted Patell test
Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) correct the Patell test for the flawed assumption of cross-
sectional independence. They accomplish this through a correction factor, taking advan-
tage of the theoretically equal variance all sample firms’ cumulated standardised ARs 
have, assuming equal estimation window lengths. Taking ρ̄ as the average correlation 
coefficient between ARs, this correction factor is (Kolari and Pynnönen 2010): 
1√
(1+(N−1)ρ̄).
The Adj.ZPatell statistic, covering t1 to t2 , is given as (Kolari and Pynnönen 2010):
Accounting for cross-sectional correlation, this is more robustly standard normally 
distributed, and can be tested against standard normal critical values.
Bootstrapping
To resolve potential non (standard) normal distributions, Kramer (1998) uses bootstrap-



























Adj.ZPatell(t1, t2) = ZPatell(t1, t2)
[
1√
(1+ (N − 1)ρ̄)
]
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the test statistics can be compared against with no power loss; assuming that the original 
bootstrapping sample robustly represents the population.
This paper modifies Kramer’s (1998) methodology, to accommodate cumulative 
Adj.ZPatell test statistics and multi-day event windows.
The bootstrap method used in this paper proceeds as follows:
1. ARs/SARs (across all sample firms and event window days) are de-meaned, to 
robustly represent the null hypothesis’ zero-mean, to produce the original bootstrap-
ping sample.2
2. The original sample is randomly drawn from, with replacement, to produce a new 
sample of ARs/SARs for each firm and event day, equal in size to the original.
3. Cross-sectional cumulative test statistics are calculated for the new sample, using the 
relevant variances and the Kolari-Pynnönen correction factor, which would be con-
stant for each firm for test statistics relating to the same time periods.
4. Steps 2–3 are repeated 1000 times,3 for each test, to generate full normal distribu-
tions representative of the test statistics under their null hypotheses.
5. The distribution values are arranged smallest to largest, with the 25th largest and 
smallest values in each distribution representing the two-tailed 95% significance crit-
ical values for that test statistic.
6. If a test statistic’s absolute value exceeds their bootstrapped critical values, the null 
hypothesis (that the event’s cross-sectional cumulative impact over the period cov-
ered by the test statistic is insignificant) can be rejected.
Results
See Table 2.
The Adjusted Patell test results with bootstrapped critical values, in Table 2, can be 
interpreted as testing fake news’ abnormal price effect, cumulative over the debunk-
ing shock, for significance over time. The most robust of the empirical tests con-
ducted, these results account for potential cross-correlation bias, unrepresentative 
excessively volatile observations, and non (standard) normal distributions.
Graphed in Fig. 4, these results confirm significant abnormal price effects. Specifi-
cally, the Adjusted Patell test values on September 27 and 30 are − 1.63 and − 1.14 
respectively, exceeding their bootstrapped two-tailed 95% critical values (± 1.20 
and ± 0.94 respectively); represented in Fig.  4, as both results fall below the boot-
strapped region. All subsequent results fall within the bootstrapped region, so their 
insignificance cannot be rejected; implying that the initial fake news abnormal price 
effect is neutralised after September 30. Table 2 indicates that these dynamics are all 
also supported by the weaker t-test and Patell test results.
This indicates that fake news generates a significant initial abnormal negative 
price effect. This gradually reverses, but remains significant for three calendar days 
2 To preserve the standardised observations the (Adjusted) Patell test relies on, de-meaned SARs are used for those 
bootstraps.
3 1000 repetitions are sufficient for robustness, with more repetitions showing “no marked change in results” (Kramer 
1998).
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post-debunking (or four, according to the t-test at 10% significance), when it should 
have reversed fully upon debunking. This robustly indicates a significant initial over-
reaction to fake news, and significant underreaction to debunking; qualitatively 
matching the model dynamics explored in the “One fake news shock and one real 
news shock” section and Fig. 3.
However, the empirical results suggest that the post-debunking underreaction is 
too protracted to be accounted for solely by the base model. According to the base 
model, fake news’ initial price impact should be significantly smaller than equivalent 
real news’ initial price impact, if ρ0 > 0.5 ; which Clarke et al. (2018) empirically sup-
port. Fake news and debunking are equivalent, but contradictory; therefore, under 
the base model, debunking should reverse fake news’ initial impact much faster than 
the three (or four) days that it empirically takes. Figure 3’s impulse-response dynam-
ics support this as, under the base model, debunking sharply reverses fake news’ ini-
tial impacts to (near) insignificance within a day, at all levels of ρ0 > 0.5 ; let alone 
over three days (or four). Therefore, the full model, which includes fake news-specific 
effects that amplify and prolong the underreaction, more appropriately explains the 
persistent post-debunking underreaction; and remains consistent with existing litera-
ture on fake news’ characteristics.
The empirical evidence thus supports the full model’s predicted secondary fake news 
impact: that fake news in a security amplifies underreactions to subsequent real news 
in the security. Combined with the qualitative accuracy of the model’s dynamics for 
debunked fake news shocks, and standalone real and fake news shocks, this validates this 
paper’s model of underreaction/overreaction, and its explanation of fake news’ financial 
impacts.
Fig. 4 Chinese ADR delisting threat event study adjusted Patell test
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Conclusion and discussion
This paper proposed a unified representative agent model of underreaction/overreac-
tion, to explain how fake news is able to have statistically significant impacts on finan-
cial markets and prices, despite contradicting the efficient-market hypothesis. Centring 
around behavioural finance biases of conservatism and confidence, the base model rec-
onciled fake news’ empirically-observed initial price impacts with empirically-observed 
underreactions to real news, through a model driven by bounded rationality over uncer-
tainty in information veracity.
The full model extended this model to a greater level of representative accuracy, by 
incorporating established fake news-specific characteristics, and also predicted a novel 
secondary impact of fake news, driven by fake news’ virality and uncertainty effects: that 
fake news in a security amplifies underreactions to subsequent real news for the security.
To validate the model, a large-sample empirical event study was conducted on the 
2019 Chinese ADR Delisting Threat fake news and debunking event. Using the Adjusted 
Patell test with bootstrapped normal critical values, this robustly accounted for cross-
sectional correlation, unrepresentative excessively volatile observations, and non (stand-
ard) normal distributions.
The resultant empirical dynamics qualitatively matched the modelled dynamics. They 
were also found more appropriately represented by the full model variant, supporting 
the full model’s predicted secondary fake news effect. Combined with the model’s quali-
tatively accurate representation of price underreactions/overreactions to standalone real 
and fake news, these results strongly validated this paper’s proposed model and explana-
tion of fake news’ impacts in the financial markets.
It is important to note though, that this paper’s model is a simplified one, relying on 
several assumptions. The objective of this paper’s model was to initiate the research into 
this field, and provide a base model which could provide a formal economic rationale for 
the primary drivers of fake news’ financial impacts. By initiating this research, this paper 
aims to inspire future research into expanding the model, allowing for deeper and wider 
exploration of the variables and conditions under which fake news is able to significantly 
impact financial markets.
For instance, future model extensions could include heterogenous agents with vary-
ing abilities to distinguish information veracity, ρ , or agents which condition on his-
torical price trends—both of which are closer to reality, but were simplified in this 
model for the sake of parsimoniousness and isolating the main factors driving fake 
news’ financial impacts. This is because, in reality, the model’s sole representative 
agent would actually be several heterogenous agent types, with inter-agent influences 
and interactions, that would further amplify, compound, and influence the factors 
discussed in this paper—and so this would be a good area for further research. Addi-
tionally, extensions examining the influence of information transmission mechanisms 
(i.e. news outlets or the means through which news shocks reach agents) would be 
valuable. This is because, while this paper’s model simplified news shocks as exog-
enously generated to focus on the fake or real nature of each shock, transmission 
mechanisms undeniably influence how news shocks influence agents. Furthermore, 
incorporating other applicable behavioural finance effects (e.g. herding and con-
firmation bias), and estimating precise empirical values for the model’s variables to 
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evaluate its quantitative accuracy, would be valuable to more accurately understand 
fake news’ dynamics.
Additionally, the empirical robustness measures ensured strong internal validity, 
but external validity of the empirical results would also be ideally confirmed with 
alternate debunked fake news events. However, as previously discussed, the general 
scarcity and nicheness of debunked financial fake news prevented this, as the few 
alternate examples only affected single firms; and small-sample event studies empiri-
cally suffer significant power loss (MacKinlay 1997), which would therefore impede 
any statistical tests conducted. Therefore, confirming the empirical results’ external 
validity, through additional tests on alternate datasets as more large-sample debunked 
fake news events occur, would be an invaluable area for further research.
Appendix: Dataset of event study sample firms
Company name Ticker Market cap. ($mm)
Alibaba Group Holding Limited NYSE: BABA 521,936.2
PetroChina Company Limited NYSE: PTR 108,050.4
China Life Insurance Company Inc NYSE: LFC 100,698.2
China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation NYSE: SNP 73,017.6
JD.com Inc NASDAQ: JD 60,722.4
Pinduoduo Inc NASDAQ: PDD 54,408.2
CNOOC Limited NYSE: CEO 50,745.4
NetEase Inc NASDAQ: NTES 41,630.7
Baidu Inc NASDAQ: BIDU 33,208.4
TAL Education Group NYSE: TAL 29,528.0
China Telecom Corporation Limited NYSE: CHA 27,941.2
ZTO Express (Cayman) Inc NYSE: ZTO 22,270.4
Tencent Music Entertainment Group NYSE: TME 21,341.8
New Oriental Education and Technology Group Inc NYSE: EDU 19,028.9
Yum China Holdings Inc NYSE: YUMC 17,454.9
Trip.com Group Limited NASDAQ: TCOM 14,216.2
iQIYI Inc NASDAQ: IQ 12,002.4
BeiGene Ltd NASDAQ: BGNE 10,870.6
VipShop Holdings Limited NYSE: VIPS 10,220.8
Huazhu Group Limited NASDAQ: HTHT 9442.7
China Eastern Airlines Corporation Limited NYSE: CEA 9106.6
Autohome Inc NYSE: ATHM 8839.1
Bilibili Inc NASDAQ: BILI 8684.0
China Southern Airlines Company Limited NYSE: ZNH 8579.1
Huaneng Power International Inc NYSE: HNP 8222.7
GDS Holdings Limited NASDAQ: GDS 8217.8
Weibo Corporation NASDAQ: WB 7921.6
58.com Inc NYSE: WUBA 7662.6
Aluminum Corporation of China Limited NYSE: ACH 6027.6
Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Company Limited NYSE: SHI 5062.3
Zai Lab Limited NASDAQ: ZLAB 4511.9
Momo Inc NASDAQ: MOMO 4497.6
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Joyy Inc NASDAQ: YY 4191.7
China Biologic Products Holdings Inc NASDAQ: CBPO 4045.8
51job Inc NASDAQ: JOBS 3854.9
Nio Limited NYSE: NIO 3345.7
HUYA Inc NYSE: HUYA 3316.5
Hutchison China MediTech Limited NASDAQ: HCM 2887.5
Guangshen Railway Company Limited NYSE: GSH 2160.6
SinaCorporation NASDAQ: SINA 2145.9
BEST Inc NYSE: BEST 1999.9
Baozun Inc NASDAQ: BZUN 1806.4
Noah Holdings Limited NYSE: NOAH 1602.2
21Vianet Group Inc NASDAQ: VNET 1599.0
360 Finance Inc NASDAQ: QFIN 1500.3
LexinFintech Holdings Ltd NASDAQ: LX 1373.0
Sogou Inc NYSE: SOGO 1322.8
GreenTree Hospitality Group Ltd NYSE: GHG 1289.5
Fanhua Inc NASDAQ: FANH 943.4
Bitauto Holdings Limited NYSE: BITA 826.1
OneSmart International Education Group Limited NYSE: ONE 781.5
Huami Corporation NYSE: HMI 766.9
Bright Scholar Education Holdings Limited NYSE: BEDU 765.5
Cango Inc NYSE: CANG 754.9
Daqo New Energy Corp NYSE: DQ 689.7
JinkoSolar Holding Co. Ltd NYSE: JKS 659.1
Niu Technologies NASDAQ: NIU 636.1
Qutoutiao Inc NASDAQ: QTT 624.4
111 Inc NASDAQ: YI 595.5
Changyou.com Limited NASDAQ: CYOU 576.0
FinVolution Group NYSE: FINV 544.2
China Online Education Group NYSE: COE 519.2
Puxin Limited NYSE: NEW 485.6
CooTek (Cayman) Inc NYSE: CTK 441.9
Uxin Limited NASDAQ: UXIN 422.7
Yintech Investment Holdings Limited NASDAQ: YIN 412.9
Qudian Inc NYSE: QD 406.0
Viomi Technology Co. Ltd NASDAQ: VIOT 403.1
Up Fintech Holding Limited NASDAQ: TIGR 381.4
Puyi Inc NASDAQ: PUYI 367.9
Yiren Digital Ltd NYSE: YRD 348.7
Sohu.com Limited NASDAQ: SOHU 293.8
Cheetah Mobile Inc NYSE: CMCM 271.6
CNFinance Holdings Limited NYSE: CNF 267.5
Aurora Mobile Limited NASDAQ: JG 266.2
Ruhnn Holding Limited NASDAQ: RUHN 262.3
Tarena International Inc NASDAQ: TEDU 253.0
Leju Holdings Limited NYSE: LEJU 248.4
RISE Education Cayman Ltd NASDAQ: REDU 247.5
China Distance Education Holdings Limited NYSE: DL 246.6
Jumei International Holding Limited NYSE: JMEI 227.2
Xunlei Limited NASDAQ: XNET 214.8
Nam Tai Property Inc NYSE: NTP 190.0
500.com Limited NYSE: WBAI 187.9
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Kandi Technologies Group Inc NASDAQ: KNDI 180.7
LAIX Inc NYSE: LAIX 167.5
Secoo Holding Limited NASDAQ: SECO 157.3
Jianpu Technology Inc NYSE: JT 155.3
X Financial NYSE: XYF 152.3
Xinyuan Real Estate Co. Ltd NYSE: XIN 133.2
MOGU Inc NYSE: MOGU 112.8
Phoenix New Media Limited NYSE: FENG 101.2
Tuniu Corporation NASDAQ: TOUR 96.4
Fang Holdings Limited NYSE: SFUN 92.4
RYB Education Inc NYSE: RYB 74.8
Pintec Technology Holdings Limited NASDAQ: PT 49.6
TD Holdings Inc NASDAQ: GLG 49.5
ReneSola Ltd NYSE: SOL 48.3
Jupai Holdings Limited NYSE: JP 38.8
Gulf Resources Inc NASDAQ: GURE 37.0
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